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he extraordinary deterrence 
of private antitrust enforcement: 
A reply to Werden, Hammond, 
and Barnett 
BY ROBERT H. LANDE* AND JOSHUA P. DAVIS** 
In 2011, we documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked 
fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anti-
competitive conduct. Indeed the article showed that private enforce-
ment probably deters even more anti competitive conduct than the 
almost universally admired anticartel enforcement program of the 
United States Department of Justice. 
In a recent issue of The Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. 
Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett, members of the Justice Depart-
ment staff, challenged our analysis, asserting that our comparison "is 
more misleading than informative." However, their specific criticisms 
do not withstand scrutiny. In this reply, we explain why our original 
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conclusions survive the efforts of Werden, Hammond, and Barnett to 
debunk them. 
KEY WORDS: private antitrust litigation, private antitrust enforcement, 
deterrence, criminal antitrust enforcement, carte/s, optimal deterrence, cartel 
deterrence, antitrust litigation, antitrust damages, antitrust class actions 
Our 2011 article, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and 
Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, I documents an extraor-
dinary but usually overlooked fact: Private antitrust enforcement 
deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. The article 
shows that "there is evidence"2 that private enforcement "probably"3 
deters even more anti competitive conduct than the almost univer-
sally admired4 anticartel enforcement program of the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Although our article's comparison considers a large number of fac-
tors and requires seventy-one law review pages to develop its analysis 
and conclusions, some parts of the comparison it makes are relatively 
simple: The article totals the value of every DOJ anticartel sanction from 
1990 to 2007, which equals $7.737 billion.5 The article compares this to the 
$21.9 to $23.9 billion in sanctions resulting from just forty large private 
antitrust cases that concluded during the same period.6 On the basis of 
this and other evidence the article concludes that private enforcement 
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private 
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REv. 
315 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papoers.cfm ?asstract 
jd1565693. 
[d. at 348. 
We included this qualifier. [d. at 315. 
As we stated, we "strongly" agree with this consensus "and are second 
to no one in our appreciation of the oars anti-cartel activity." [d. at 316. 
The total includes corporate and individual fines, restitution 
payments, and an equivalent value for prison time and house arrest. [d. at 337. 
[d. at 338. The total includes payments made in these forty cases or 
clusters of related cases, but neither the value of the injunctive relief secured 
nor the amounts defendants paid in litigation expenses. 
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"probably" deters more anticompetitive activity than DOJ anticartel 
enforcement. The article also concludes that private enforcement 
deserves much more praise than it typically receives, not the scorn so 
frequently given to it by the antitrust field. 
In a recent issue of The Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott 
D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett (WHB) challenge our analysis.7 
They assert that our comparison "is more misleading than informa-
tive."S Although we understand and admire the instinct of these OOJ 
employees to proclaim the superiority of the remedies secured by the 
fine institution to which they have devoted many years of their lives, 
their specific criticisms fail to undermine our conclusions. In their 
article WHB offer six separate critiques of our analysis, which we now 
consider in tum. 
First, one of the items we included in the DOl's deterrence total 
was the monetary equivalent of the 330.24 years that cartel defen-
dants were sentenced to prison during the eighteen-year period we 
studied.9 WHB complain that we use only $2 million as the deterrence 
value (or disvalue) of a year in prison. 1o They assert this figure is too 
low, but never provide a higher figure they believe is acceptable. ll 
Moreover, the only evidence they provide for their assertion that $2 
million per year is inadequate is their undocumented conclusion that 
"some" defendants spend more than this in legal fees attempting to 
stay out of prison and "some" would pay even more to escape prison 
ou tright. 12 
Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, & Belinda A. Barnett, 
Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using All The Tools and Sanctions, 56 
ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227-33 (2011). 
[d. at 229. 
Lande & Davis, supra note 1, at 336. 
10 Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 229. 
11 [d. 
12 [d. WHB never provide specifics. For example, do they have evidence 
that individual defendants frequently spend $5 million in legal fees in an 
attempt to avoid a potential two-year prison sentence? Or that some 
individual defendants have paid $10 million in legal fees when they face a 
five-year sentence? WHB present only assertions. 
176 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 58, No. l/Spring 2013 
However, although our article analyzed a number of approxima-
tion techniques to arrive at the estimate that a year of prison is 
"worth" no more than $2 million,13 immediately after we did this-in 
the very next paragraph!-we tripled it to $6 million because of our 
stated desire to be conservative and our belief that individual sanc-
tions count more than corporate sanctions.14 In other words, in the 
next paragraph we use $6 million as the equivalent value of a year in 
prison. We accordingly added $6 million-not $2 million-times the 
number of years in prison to the corporate fines and other monetary 
sanctions to arrive at a total of $7.737 billion for the deterrence value 
of DOJ enforcement. This is what we compare to the private total. IS 
WHB also fail to mention our "flip" figure. We show that only if 
one disvalues a year in prison as greater than $43-$48 million would 
DOJ anticartel enforcement deter more anticompetitive conduct than 
does private enforcement. (Actually, this number is based on the 
deterrent effect of just the forty private cases we analyzedl6; we have 
since documented many hundreds of millions of additional dollars 




Lande & Davis, supra note 1, at 335 n.72. 
Id. at 336. 
Id. 
16 Id. at 340. Further, we compared the private total to an Antitrust 
Division total that, as WHB concede, includes nonantitrust fines secured by 
the Antitrust Division. Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 228 
n.84. WHB surely have access to nonpublic data showing how much of what 
the Division reports publicly as "antitrust fines" in fact is related to other 
crimes that they uncovered during the course of antitrust investigations. 
WHB should reveal how much of the fines that we, when we performed our 
study using the data the Antitrust Division published, classified as DOJ 
antitrust fines, actually are nonantitrust fines. Because we included these 
nonantitrust fines, our analysis was too favorable toward finding a high 
amount of deterrent effects from DOJ antitrust activity. 
Similarly, some of the prison time the publicly available Antitrust 
Division statistics attribute to antitrust offenses could have resulted from 
non antitrust crimes, and not every prison sentence was served in full. We 
urge WHB to provide data that is as accurate as possible so we all could 
perform a fairer DOJ-private comparison. 
17 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Summaries of Twenty Cases of 
Successful Private Antitrust Enforcement (U.5.F. Law Research Paper, 2011), 
CARTEL DETERRENCE: A REPLY: 177 
We are as mystified by WHB's criticism of our article for allegedly 
using $2 million as the value of a year in prison as we are curious as 
to whether they believe that a year in prison on average should be 
disvalued at more than $43-$48 million. After all, the issue is not the 
highest amount any defendant would pay to avoid prison. For a gen-
eral comparison such as we are making, one should examine the 
value or disvalue of a year in prison to the average potential antitrust 
violator. WHB provide no data on this issue, however. For the reasons 
given in our article we believe that the figure we actually used in our 
analysis-$6 million per year-is conservative and generousY Cer-
tainly WHB have done nothing to demonstrate that the figure is too 
low. 
Second, WHB complain that we do not value the stigma and lost 
future income that follow from serving time in prison.19 We wish, how-
ever, they had provided data on this issue's significance or magnitude. 
If they had, we would have been glad to include it in our calculations. 
In fact, we do have some preliminary, highly tentative evidence 
that at least some, and perhaps as many as half, of convicted price 
fixers go back to work in the same industry or even in the same 
firm, after they are released from prison. 20 We also have evidence 
that sometimes the corporate attitude is that the person who went 
to prison "took a bullet for the team" and for this reason should be 
rehired after his or her release from prison, perhaps even at a 
higher salary.21 We also know, anecdotally, of situations such as 
that involving Alfred Taubman, in which there seems to be little or 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961669 (study of twenty additional 
cases of successful private antitrust enforcement). 
18 Lande & Davis, supra note 1, at 335-36. 
19 Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 229. 
20 See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional 
Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement 36 (July 30, 2012) 
(unpublished draft) (on file with the authors). See also John M. Connor & 
Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 427, 440-42 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1917657. 
21 See Connor & Lande, supra note 20, at 440. 
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no stigma or loss of social status after release from prison for bid 
rigging.22 
Maybe on average the future income and social status of con-
victed price fixers decrease significantly. But maybe not. However, 
even if their future income decreased by another $1 million for each 
year of imprisonment-a figure we strongly doubt-the actual figure 
we used as the deterrence value of a year in prison-$6 million-
should still be more than high enough. Moreover, even if the deter-
rence value of prison were increased to make up for lost future wages 
and social status, we find it inconceivable that a year of prison would 
have a total disvalue to an individual of more than the $43-$48 mil-
lion required to "flip" our calculations. Only if the yearly deterrence 
from prison (including lost future income and social status) on aver-
age exceeded $43-$48 million would DOJ anti cartel enforcement be 
found to deter more anticompetitive conduct than these forty private 
cases. Do WHB believe this? 
We urge WHB to perform a study of the issues they raise. We urge 
WHB to study the stigma issue-what actually happens to social sta-
tus after price fixers are released from prison? We also urge WHB to 
ascertain how often price fixers go back to work for their old firms or 
for other firms in the same industry, and whether their salaries 
increased or decreased as a result of their imprisonment. Finally, we 
also urge DOJ to routinely include provisions in plea agreements bar-
ring convicted price fixers from ever working in the same industry in 
which they fixed prices. 
Third, WHB state that our use of the standard optimal deterrence 
model (which assumes risk neutrality) for entire cartels is inappropri-
ate because if the most risk-averse member of a cartel cracks, the car-
tel will crack.23 For this reason the optimal deterrence target need only 
be the most risk-averse member of a cartel. 
This observation is interesting and correct. But it seems likely that 
most cartelists are by nature risk seekers. After all, they form cartels 
even though this subjects them both to the risk of getting caught, 
22 [d. at 438 n.4S. 
23 See Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 229-30. 
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tried, imprisoned, fined, and fired, and to the lower social status and 
future income that WHB assert are so significant. Accordingly, the 
appropriate focus of an optimal deterrence calculation actually should 
be on the most risk-averse member of a risk-seeking group of cartel 
members. Is this person or corporation net risk neutral, net a risk 
avoider, or still a net risk seeker? We do not know. Neither do WHB, 
and they provide no data that would help analyze this issue. 
WHB similarly contend that discouraging a single individual at a 
single potential cartel member may suffice to prevent the illegal collu-
sive conduct.24 They also assert that criminal penalties may succeed if 
they prevent firms with a substantial market share from violating the 
antitrust laws, in part because it may suffice to discourage even a sin-
gle potential cartel member from participating.25 
This point, however, applies equally to both criminal penalties 
and to the civil liability that arises in private actions. It does not pro-
vide a reason to conclude one is more effective at deterrence than the 
other. Moreover, even if some members of some firms, or even some 
entire firms, decline to participate, the cartel nevertheless may still 
succeed in raising prices. After all, to be largely successful, a cartel 
need not consist of every firm in a market, much less every employee 
of every firm. 
Fourth, they write: "Lande & Davis also are wrong to credit the 
entire deterrent effect of damage recoveries to plaintiffs' lawyers on 
the basis that the recovery would not have occurred without the 
efforts of plaintiffs' lawyers. In fact the Antitrust Division does a great 
deal of the work that results in damage recoveries."26 
WHB would be right if we credited private plaintiffs with all the deter-
rent effects from these private cases. We did not. In fact, we explicitly 
stated that credit should be shared: The DOJ certainly should get partial 
credit for the private recoveries obtained in any cases the DOJ uncovered 
or helped to uncover, even if the private parties secured the bulk of the 
sanctions. Nevertheless, it would not be fair to give the DOJ complete 
credit for any resulting deterrence because if there had been no private 
2-1 [d. at 229. 
25 [d. at 229-30. 
26 [d. at 230. 
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enforcement, this deterrence never would have arisen. Rather, the fairest 
thing would be to share credit for this deterrence between the public and 
private enforcers.27 
We believe that ten of the forty private cases we studied (twenty-five 
percent) were follow-ons to DOJ enforcement efforts.2B This percentage is 
similar to that obtained in the classic study by Kauper & Snyder, who 
found that no more than twenty percent of all private antitrust cases 
were follow-ons to DOJ cases.29 Even if DOJ were given partial credit for 
twenty-five percent of the deterrence caused by the forty private cases 
we studied, our overall conclusion would not change significantly. 
This is especially true because the contrary point obtains as well. 
Our case studies showed that private enforcement sometimes pre-
ceded-and thereby may have significantly assisted-DOJ enforce-
ment.30 Indeed, even the much-lauded DOJ leniency program benefits 
from the threat of private enforcement. As WHB acknowledge, "One 
inducement to apply for leniency, however, is the potential to signifi-
cantly limit liability in damages suits."3! In other words, the threat of 
private enforcement helps to create the leverage necessary to induce 
antitrust violators to confess to the DOJ. 
For all these reasons, the relationship between DOJ and private 
enforcement is symbiotic. And, as a result, crediting private enforce-
27 Lande & Davis, supra note 1, at 347. 
28 [d. at 346. For a discussion of our classification methodology, see id. 
and Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.5.F. L. REv. 879, 897-99 (2008), 
available at http://papers.ssm.com/ sol3 / papers.cfm?abstracUd=1090661. 
29 See Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuses of the Antitrust 
Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 578 n.137 (1991) 
("Specifically we found, using the Georgetown Project data, that follow-on 
cases accounted for 11% of cases in the period 1973-1977 and 6% in the period 
1978-1983. (These figures exclude Multi-District Litigation cases.) More 
relevant, follow-on cases accounted for 37% of horizontal restraint cases in 
the period 1973-1977 and 20% of the same in the period 1978-1983."). 
30 For an analysiS of these issues, see Lande & Davis, supra note 28, at 
897-99. 
31 Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 233. 
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ment for all the money it recovers would be inaccurate, as would 
crediting the DOJ for all of the penalties it is able to impose through 
criminal enforcement. Our comparison, then, is a rough proxy that 
may err somewhat in either direction. The "true" ratio of private 
deterrence to DOJ deterrence therefore might not be the simple result 
that followed from our data: ($21.9-$23.9 billion in private sanc-
tions) / ($7.737 billion in public sanctions32), which equals a ratio that is 
roughly 3 to 1 in favor of private deterrence. Whether the actual ratio 
is 2 to 1 or 4 to 1 is beside the point; our article's point is that the ratio 
for all private cases-not just the forty that we studied-is "probably" 
greater than 1 to 1. 
Fifth, WHB say we assert that private plaintiffs completely uncov-
ered the conduct responsible for two of the thirteen cartel-based 
recoveries in our sample "with the government following the private 
plaintiffs' lead or playing no role at all."33 WHB further state: "In fact 
the Antitrust Division did not 'follow the private plaintiffs lead' in 
prosecuting those cartels and any suggestion that the Antitrust Divi-
sion 'played no role at all' is ridiculous."34 
However, WHB overlook the "or" in the first sentence they quote. 
We never said the government played no role in these two cases. We 
said only that the first evidence of collusion was uncovered by private 
parties. In fact, we explicitly stated in our case summaries-which 
they cite, so they must be aware of them-that the government 
played an important role in both cases. But WHB fight this "no role" 
straw man argument by showing that DOJ played an important role.35 
Our actual summaries of these cases give the government a great deal 
of credit. 
When we decided whether DOJ or a private party took the "lead," 
an important piece of evidence was whether DOJ or a private party 
uncovered the first evidence of collusion (although of course much 
32 As noted earlier, this includes prison time valued at $6 million per 
year, not $2 million per year. See Lande & Davis, supra note I, at 336. 
33 Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 231. 
Id. 
35 Id. at 232-33. 
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more is necessary to prove liability). For example, our vitamins case 
analysis contained the caveat: "[M]any of the details of the Depart-
ment of Justice investigation are non-public, and it is clear that both 
private counsel and the u.s. Department of Justice were on parallel 
tracks and discovered much of the critical evidence at around the 
same time, and that the investigation of each helped that of the 
other."36 
Our analysis of the vitamins case fairly relied on the report pro-
vided by David Boies, counsel for private plaintiffs. Boies reported 
that when his firm found the first evidence of a cartel in February 
1997, "there was no pending federal investigation."37 WHB never state 
that Boies is incorrect or unreliable, but they do say that there had 
been an ongoing federal investigation before this.38 However, we cited 
information that the DOJ investigation had stalled before private 
counsel provided them with important collusion evidence: 
u.s. investigators first got wind of the vitamins cartel and Roche's role in 
it in late 1996 from sources at [Archer Daniels Midland] cooperating with 
the DOJ in its investigation of the citric acid cartel .... As a result the FBI 
interviewed Dr. Kumo Sommer, the head of Roche's vitamins division, in 
March 1997. "Sommer denied the existence of any vitamins cartel and the 
DOJ apparently decided to wind down its investigation for the mean-
while .... [However, in] late 1997 a partner of the law firm of Boies & 
Schiller ... " presented the DOJ with evidence that a conspiracy was 
occurring.39 
Moreover, in our vitamins case study we wrote: "We attempted to 
find a public account of the origin of the vitamins cases written by the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division but could not. When we sent 
them the version contained in this document they would not com-
36 
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies 237 (U.S.F. Law Research Paper No. 
2011-22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1105523. 
37 DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 231 (2004). 
38 See Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 232. 
39 Lande & Davis, supra note 36, at 237, n.645 (quoting John M. Connor, 
The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence 25-26 (Feb. 14, 
2006) (draft), available at www.antitrustinstitute.org.). 
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ment on its accuracy or completeness."4o Further, on the crucial 
importance of the early private suit we cited the following: 
At the May 21,1999 press conference in Basel, Switzerland announcing the 
Roche guilty pleas, Hoffman-La Roche's CEO, Franz Humer, explained 
how it was the early 1998 class action lawsuit (and not a government 
investigation) that prompted a new internal investigation that caused 
Roche to terminate its conspiratorial conduct and begin to cooperate with 
the government: "In 1997, responding to the settlement in the citric acid 
case and to the news of an investigation of the bulk vitamins industry, 
Roche initiated an internal inquiry of its own, which at the time did not 
turn up any evidence of wrongdoing. A second internal inquiry prompted by 
class action lawsuits filed against Roche and other companies in early 1998 for 
alleged price-fixing in the bulk vitamins market revealed that further action was 
needed. The inquiry was carried out in collaboration with U.s. experts. 
Internal measures were implemented without delay to ensure an immedi-
ate halt to any antitrust violations. The findings this second inquiry 
formed the basis for Roche's decision to offer, on 1 March this year, its full 
cooperation in the US Justice Department investigation."4) 
We therefore stand by our description of the vitamins cartel based on 
the evidence that was then-and is now-available. 
On the subject of the second case that WHB complain about-
involving a commercial explosives cartel-they say: 
Lande and Davis credit the detection of one other cartel to plaintiffs' 
lawyers. They report that an explosives cartel was discovered in the 
course of litigation of an unrelated case. They do not indicate when evi-
dence of a cartel emerged, but they do indicate that the antitrust claims 
leading to significant damage recovery were filed in February and 
August 1996. But that was after the Division had secured guilty pleas 
from the conspirators, and evidence uncovered in the private litigation 
did not prompt the Division's investigationY 
Concerning this case we wrote the following: "This litigation and 
the government investigation that followed apparently arose out of a 
1992 private civil suit initiated by Thermex Energy Corporation ... , a 
Texas manufacturer of commercial explosives, against Atlas Powder 




Lande & Davis, supra note 36, at 236, n.642. 
[d. at 240-41. 
Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 232-33. 
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•••• "43 Our case summary certainly gave DOJ a large share of the 
credit for bringing this cartel to justice: "In September 1995, the 
Department of Justice secured guilty pleas and fines for two of the 
defendants in the Commercial Explosives litigation .... "44 
If a secret DOJ investigation uncovered evidence of collusion 
before the 1992 unrelated private action began, then this case should 
indeed be removed from the list of cases in which private enforcers 
first discovered the evidence of collusion. But WHB have not pro-
vided this evidence. Nor have they even asserted that a DOJ investi-
gation discovered evidence of collusion before the 1992 private case. 
Finally, we note WHB implicitly concede that DOJ played no role 
at all in eleven of the thirteen cases in this group by disputing our fac-
tual analysis of only the vitamins and explosives cartels cases. 
More generally, our article contained the caveats that "reasonable 
people could dispute who first discovered some of the violations that 
gave rise to the sample of 40 private cases" or which party actually 
took the lead and that we could use only imperfect publicly available 
data to perform our study.45 It is only natural for DOJ and the private 
parties to see the facts differently-for both DOJ and the private par-
ties to see ambiguous facts in a way that tends to give themselves 
more of the credit for uncovering and proving the violations at issue.46 
Indeed, they might not have always been aware of what the other 
lawyers were doing and so naturally assumed that they deserved the 
bulk of the credit. 
Finally, WHB claim that after the Supreme Court's 2007 decision 
in Twombly,47 private plaintiffs will be much more reliant on the DOJ 
to uncover and prosecute antitrust violations}8 This may well be true. 
43 
45 
Lande & Davis, supra note 36, at 62. 
ld. at 63. 
See Lande & Davis, supra note 1, at 346. 
46 WHB's complaint over credit for two of the forty cases we studied 
helps prove the proverb, "Success has many fathers while failure is an orphan." 
47 Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.s. 544 (2007). 
48 See Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7, at 231. 
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But it would not affect the results of our study, which covered the 
period from 1990 to 2007. Moreover, once sufficient time has passed, 
the relative deterrent effects of private and OOJ antitrust enforcement 
should be reassessed not by speculation, but on the basis of evidence. 
Indeed, the antitrust world's general failure to base policy on evi-
dence has caused great mischief. Twombly itself was based on an 
empirical premise that was both unsubstantiated and implausible-
the assumption that the sorts of wealthy and powerful corporations 
that are the subject of antitrust lawsuits often settle even meritless 
claims for huge sums.<9 
In conclusion, Werden, Hammond and Barnett provide no reason 
to doubt our article's findings. Indeed, the article showed that private 
enforcement "probably" deters more anticompetitive activity than the 
DO]'s anticartel program after comparing the deterrence of only forty 
of the many private cases filed during an eighteen-year period with 
the deterrence from every OOJ cartel case filed during the same 
period. A fortiori, the deterrent effects from every private enforcement 
action might well have been many times as large as that from the DOJ 
anticartel program. Our latest case studies demonstrate that our ini-
tial study was conservative, as was our overall conclusion that private 
enforcement "probably" deters more conduct than OOJ private 
enforcement. 50 
49 For an analysis of the questionable policy basis of Twombly, see Joshua 
P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists: Questionable Innovation in 
the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 356, 
369-74 (2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1542143; see also Joshua P. 
Davis and Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of 
Procedure, 17 CEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 969, 978-81 (2010), available at 
http://ssm.com I abstract=1578459. See also Charles Silver, "We're Scared to 
Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) 
(rejecting the argument that class actions constitute a form of legalized 
blackmail). 
50 In a related point, WHB argue that private litigation against small 
cartels often is not viable. Werden, Hammond & Barnett, supra note 7 at 228, 
n.82. This is a fair point. And a reason to make private actions less costly and 
therefore viable in a broader range of cases. On the other hand, there are also 
a significant number of cases that the DOJ will not prosecute, either because 
of a limited DOJ budget, because they are not the kinds of traditional cartel 
cases that DOJ pursues, or because the odds of the DOJ prevailing are not 
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We stress that we did not perform this comparison to denigrate in 
any manner the excellent work performed by the Antitrust Division, 
of which we remain huge fans. Indeed, we would like to reemphasize 
that private enforcement and public enforcement on the whole work 
wonderfully well together and in harmony toward the goal of pro-
moting the public interest. 
Rather, we undertook our analysis to determine whether private 
enforcement is underappreciated and deserves a significant share of 
the credit for deterring anticompetitive conduct. Although we appre-
ciate that WHB studied our article and we enjoy discussing the details 
of our analysis, we believe it now would be more productive to focus 
instead on designing ways for private and public enforcement to 
cooperate to better approximate an optimal level of deterrence for 
anticompetitive conduct. 
ADDENDUM 
The editor-in-chief of The Antitrust Bulletin showed the foregoing 
reply to Werden, Hammond & Barnett. Dr. Gregory Werden responded 
with the rejoinder that follows.5! The editor-in-chief also allowed us to 
write the following brief response. 
Gregory Werden's thoughtful rejoinder does just what one 
would hope from an exchange: It boils our friendly disagreement 
down to a couple of key points. The first is empirical and the second 
philosophical. 
sufficiently high. In fact, the extraordinary success rate of DOJ prosecutions 
suggests it is unwilling to take a significant risk of losing in litigation, which 
means a substantial amount of illegal conduct will go unpunished. For a 
discussion of these and related points see Lande & Davis, supra note 28, at 
905-07. 
In sum, DOJ criminal enforcement works better in some cases and 
private enforcement works better in others. This is further evidence that 
public and private enforcement complement one another, both working in the 
direction of the public good. 
51 Gregory J. Werden, Cartel Deterrence Through Criminal Enforcement: A 
Rejoinder to Lande and Davis, 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 191 (2013). 
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The empirical issue is whether deterrence caused by monetary 
sanctions imposed on corporations and individuals can be equated in 
some rough way with incarceration imposed on individuals. Our 
work shows that if this sort of calculation is possible, then the finan-
cial penalties achieved through private civil enforcement of the 
antitrust laws likely have a more significant deterrent effect than the 
criminal penalties obtained by the DOJ. Private civil awards have 
been so large that private enforcement has a larger deterrent effect 
even if one equates an implausibly large financial penalty- $10 mil-
lion, $20 million, or even $40 million on average-with a single year 
in prison. Of course, it is possible that the typical disvalue of time 
spent in prison by potential price fixers is infinite. So Werden implies. 
But that hardly seems likely. After all, people often fix prices despite 
the known risk of jail time. As an informal test of the possibility that 
many or most people infinitely disvalue prison, we invite the readers 
of this article to ask themselves a question: Suppose they were caught 
fixing prices and had to choose between one of two possible penal-
ties-either forfeit all their wealth (including pensions and benefits) 
or spend one day in prison. We submit that most readers would 
decide to spend one day in prison. Or two days. Or three days. Or .... 
But at some point each reader would instead prefer to forfeit all his 
wealth. The tipping point would be different for each person, but we 
doubt many would in effect consider prison time to have an infinite 
disvalue. 
We believe, moreover, the prospect of a large enough financial 
penalty would cause corporations to change their cultures and launch 
more effective internal compliance programs-including internal 
reward and punishment programs-that would minimize illegal con-
duct. Indeed, corporate culture might be a more important variable 
for predicting legal violations than whether a few individuals are 
incarcerated, especially if a corporation rehires individual price fixers 
after their release from prison (our preliminary data suggests this 
might not be rare52 ), effectively signaling that the price fixers are val-
ued employees who "took a bullet for the team." By contrast, a heavy 
financial sanction should give rational corporate management a 
strong incentive to find ways to encourage compliance with the law. 
52 See supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text. 
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The second claim is more philosophical in nature. We contend that 
private enforcement probablt3 "does more" to deter anticompetitive 
behavior than DOJ criminal enforcement. 54 On this issue there is a real 
chance that we and Werden are just speaking past each other. Who is 
right may depend in part on value judgments about how best to 
understand causation. If the DOJ plays the most important role in dis-
covering illegal cartels, but private sanctions provide most of the deter-
rent effects, who deserves more of the credit? 
53 Werden quotes our conclusion, but without its important "probably" 
qualifier. He writes: "We nevertheless disputed the suggestion of Robert 
Lande and Joshua Davis that 'private antitrust enforcement does more than 
[DOJj criminal enforcement to deter anticompetitive behavior ... .' " Werden, 
supra note 51, at 192. Crucially, we always attach a qualifier to our conclusion, 
such as "probably" or "there is evidence that." Our articles present a 
considerable amount of evidence that our conclusion probably is correct, but 
because we can analyze only the imperfect data that is available, and 
recognize the ambiguities in how and when to allocate credit for deterrence, 
we qualify our conclusion appropriately. 
54 We are puzzled that Dr. Werden attempts to divert attention from our 
comparison by suggesting that we instead perform a different comparison, 
one involving DO],s other antitrust activity. ld. at 194 ("Lande and Davis 
prefer to compare the deterrent value of criminal sanctions in cartel cases to 
the deterrent value of private damage recoveries in all antitrust cases, but 
they ignore the impact of government enforcement outside the cartel area. 
There may be no satisfactory way to compare the deterrent effect of private 
damages actions with the deterrent effect of noncriminal government 
antitrust enforcement (for example, against mergers), but any comparison 
that simply ignores the contributions of government enforcement is 
indefensible."). Our goal was only to show that private enforcement fares 
well against one important benchmark-DOJ criminal enforcement. We did 
not mean-or claim-to measure private enforcement against all DOJ 
enforcement. Moreover, we did offer a comparison of private enforcement 
only against cartels to DOJ enforcement only against cartels, and even this 
comparison found more deterrence from private enforcement. See Lande & 
Davis, supra note 1, at 339 n.85 (showing that just twenty-five private cartel 
cases produced sanctions of $9.2 to $10.6 billion, which was more than the 
total deterrence from every DOJ cartel case brought from 1990 to 2007, which 
totaled $6.756 billion in sanctions). We did not attempt to compare private 
enforcement against mergers or monopolization to government enforcement 
in these areas for a host of reasons, including the difficulties in valuing the 
injunctions secured in private or government cases. 
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Werden suggests one way of addressing this issue. He claims that 
the" Antitrust Division's cartel enforcement would thrive without pri-
vate enforcement, while damage recoveries in cartel cases would 
decline precipitously without the Division's criminal enforcement."55 
He also claims that for every case in our sample, "a private damages 
settlement was achieved only after the Antitrust Division secured at 
least one conviction."56 
Maybe. We certainly dispute that every private case in our sample 
was simply a follow-on to a DOJ case.57 But even if that were true, we 
believe it is crucial that the private cases secured settlements that very 
significantly added to the deterrent effects of the original DOJ cases.58 
Philosophically, we framed the issue of the deterrent effects of sanc-
tions imposed as the right measure of "doing more." By this standard, 
private enforcement fares quite well. 
We could argue about which is the right measure of "doing 
more." Perhaps we will in the future. For now, however, it seems safe 
to conclude that DOJ criminal enforcement is extraordinarily impor-
tant, as is private enforcement, and the two have, as we have written, 
55 Werden, supra note 51, at 194. 
56 [d. 
57 We believe that only ten of forty cases in our original survey were 
follow-on cases, a figure consistent with a twenty percent estimate by Kauper 
and Snyder. Kauper & Snyder, supra note 29. Moreover, many of the private 
cases we classified as follow-ons were broader than the original DOJ cases, 
and even if DOJ were given partial credit for twenty-five percent of the 
deterrence caused by the forty private cases we studied, our overall 
conclusion would not change significantly. 
58 Moreover, the conventional view within the antitrust field concerning 
the typical conduct of the plaintiffs' bar could help to magnify the relative 
deterrent effects of private enforcement. According to one branch of the 
conventional wisdom, plaintiffs' attorneys are an unethical, ravenous, and 
crazed pack of jackals who will go to any lengths-do anything, no matter 
how unfair-to attack defendants and strip them to the bone. Government 
enforcers, by contrast, are tough, but also honorable, responsible, and rational 
public servants whose activity is usually subject to intense public scrutiny. 
They have to fight fairly and ethically. For this reason government 
enforcement could, ceteris paribus, engender relatively less fear among 
corporations and therefore provide less deterrence. 
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a "symbiotic" relationship. Both are crucial and, even together, proba-
bly insufficient. 59 Both should be strengthened. And each should be 
mindful how it can best help the other. Little seems to tum on which 
one is the best. 
59 See Connor & Lande, supra note 20, at 428. 
